Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

State of Utah v. Lisa Deherrera : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; attorney for appellee.
Benjamin A. Hamilton; attorney for appellant.
JAN GRAHAM Utah A t t o r n e y General 236 S t a t e Capitol S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114
RANDALL K. SPENCER (6992) Utah County P u b l i c Defenders 40 South 100 West, S u i t e 200
Provo, Utah 84601 Telephone: (801) 379-2570 A t t o r n e y for Appellant UTAH C0UHT OF
APPEALS UTAH DOCUMENT
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Deherrera, No. 960300 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/240

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
)

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

;

RAYMOND DEHERRERA,

]1

Case No. 960300-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Burglary, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 (1953 as amended), in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis

Frederick, Judge,

presiding.

BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON
356 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE C E '
" I J""I AH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
)

RAYMOND DEHERRERA,

Case No. 960300-CA
Priori ty No. 2

D e f e nda n t/Appe11an t.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and convj-*-

. . ,

violation of Utah Code Annotated § 7b-6-2('2

, in

I95 ; as amended),

in

t h e I h i r d J u d i c i a .1 U i s t r i c t C o u i: t i i i a i I d f o r S a ] t I , a k e C o i i n t y,
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis

Frederick, Judge,

presiding.

BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON
356 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111
Attorney for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capito1 Bui 1ding
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
A1 !

*-••• f o r A p p e l l e e

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS...

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
I.

II.

THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS.

6

TRIAL COUNSEL'S EYESIGHT PROHIBITED
HIM FROM EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING
THE APPELLANT.

10

CONCLUSION

11

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
Fernandez v. cook. 870 P.2d 870,(Utah 1993).

2

State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182,(Utah 1990)..

2, 7, 8, 9

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

6, 7, 8, 9

United States v. Taylor. 832 F.2d 1187,(10th Cir. 1987)
State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236,(Utah 1995)

7
10

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953 as amended)

1, 2, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1992)

1

Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a)

1

Utah Const. amend. VI

1

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
)

RAYMOND DEHERRERA,

Case No. 960300-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. P.
26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment
and conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital
felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this
brief:

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether trial counsel was ineffective in his trial

preparation, investigation and failure to call an expert witness
to espouse his theory of the case?
"Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve a mixed
question of law and fact.

Thus, *where a trial court has

previously heard a motion based on ineffective assistance of
counsel, reviewing courts are free to make an independent
determination of a trial court's conclusions.'

However, the

findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1993); State v.
Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for one
count of burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-202, in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, presiding.

On January 16, 1996, a jury found the

defendant guilty of one count of burglary.
On March 29, 1996, the trial court sentenced the defendant
to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the burglary
conviction.
appeal.

After the sentencing the defendant filed a notice of

Pursuant to that appeal

counsel for the defendant

filed, on December 4, 1996, a motion to remand for determination
of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2

On January 10, 1997, this

Court granted the remand and ordered the case remanded to the
District Court for an evidentiary hearing.

On March 24, 1997, an

evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Frederick in the Third
District Court.

Following that remand the defendant's appeal is

now before this Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
It was alleged at trial that the appellant was inside
the house of Kenneth Struhs, when he was shot in the leg by Mr.
Struhs.

(Tr. 1/16/96 at 37-68).

In the opening statement made

by trial counsel it is clear that the theory of the case

as

stated by appellant's trial counsel was that the appellant was
not in Mr. Struhs house when he was shot, but was there with an
acquaintance and was unaware of the fact that the acquaintance
was breaking into the house until it was too late.

(Tr. 1/16/96

at 30-37) .
In accordance with trial counsel's theory of the case, and
the appellant's explanation for his presence outside Mr. Struhs
residence, the family of the appellant and the appellant

alleges

that trial counsel requested and obtained money from them to hire
an expert.

(Tr. 3/24/97 at 9, 16, 18-19).

expert was ever obtained.

However, no such

In fact, trial counsel did not call

any witnesses at the one day trial.

Instead, he testified that

he was relying on cross-examination techniques to represent the

3

appellant.
During the trial, appellant's trial counsel attempted to
cross-examine Mr. Struhs on the fact that the appellant was shot
in the back of the leg and not the front.
67).

(Tr. 1/16/96 at 66-

This fact was crucial to his theory of the case.

However,

as he attempted to ask questions regarding the entry location of
the wound he was stopped by the court because there was no expert
testimony to support his claim.

(Tr. 1/16/96 at 67). However,

at the Rule 23B hearing on remand the appellant's trial counsel
testified that he wanted an expert but that he did not have the
resources.

(Tr. 3/24/97 at 57). However, appellant's trial

counsel could not even testify that he contacted any expert
witnesses in this case.

(Tr. 3/24/97 at 59). Although, he did

testify that it would have been "perhaps effective to have an
expert witness if we knew and if we'd been able to get a hold of
that expert witness at a time we were going to feel very
confident what he was going to testify to..."

(Tr. 3/24/97 at

63) .
At the rule 23B hearing the court accepted as a proffer the
fact that the defendant was outside of the home at the time of
the shooting.

(Tr. 3/24/97 at 6 ) . He accepted as a proffer the

fact that the defendant never entered the home.
7).

(Tr. 3/24/97 at

The court also accepted as a proffer the fact that the

defendant was turning to his right, away from the shooter, when
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he was shot from the back of the leg.

(Tr. 3/24/97 at 11).

Furthermore, at the hearing on remand an expert testified
that the key trial witness Mr. Struhs' trial testimony would have
been shown to be inconsistent and unbelievable had he, as an
expert,

testified at trial.

(Tr.

3/24/97 at 37-41).

Appellant's trial counsel's vision is seriously impaired.
The record is replete with the fact that trial counsel's vision
was impaired.

(Tr. 1/16/96 at 30, 78 and tr. 3/15/96 at 2-3).

At the hearing on remand the appellant's trial counsel testified
that he was legally blind in one eye and just barely above
legally blind in the other eye.

(Tr. 3/24/97 at 47-48).

He

testified that he could only see photographs if they were a
couple of inches away from him.

(Tr. 3/24/97 at 50). He also

testified that he cannot see anybody distinctly.

(Tr. 3/24/97 at

49) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The attorney hired to represent the appellant at trial was
deficient in his performance.

Having failed to adequately

investigate the case and call a material expert witness to
support his theory of the case, the appellant's trial counsel was
ineffective.

Counsel was given money to obtain an expert and did

not contact any expert about the case.

Had counsel called an

expert to support his theory of the case there is a reasonable

5

probability of a different result.

Also, trial counsel's

eyesight was so bad that it prohibited effective representation.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court, analyzing the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution,1 set out a two-prong test for determining
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court stated:

First, the defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as
the 'counsel1 guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687.
In deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
court must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's actions at
the time of the alleged error and in light of all the
circumstances,

id. at 689.

A court must make "every effort . .

lr

This Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "in all criminal
prosecutions," the accused shall have the "assistance of counsel for his defense." United States
Constitution Amendment VI.
6

. to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight."

Id.

An

evaluating court must "indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy."

United States v.

Taylor, 832 F.2d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 1987)(quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689).
In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court was confronted with a similar issue as the present
case.

In Templin, the defendant was convicted by a jury of rape

and aggravated sexual assault.

The defendant claimed that his

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to contact several
prospective witnesses.

The Utah Supreme Court following

Strickland stated:
If counsel does not adequately investigate
the underlying facts of a case, including the
availability of prospective defense
witnesses, counsel's performance cannot fall
within the Vide range of reasonable
professional assistance.' This is because a
decision not to investigate cannot be
considered a tactical decision. It is only
after adequate inquiry has been made that
counsel can make a reasonable decision to
call or not to call particular witnesses for
tactical reasons. Therefore, because
defendant's trial counsel did not make a
reasonable investigation into the possibility
of procuring prospective defense witnesses,
the first part of the Strickland test has
been met.

7

State v, Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (emphasis added, citations
omitted).
A similar situation exists here.

The defendant's trial

counsel did not adequately investigate this case, nor did he
prepare adequately for trial.

It was clear that trial counsel's

theory of the case was that the appellant did not enter the
residence.

However, his only preparation was to believe that he

could obtain the information he needed through adequate crossexamination.

(Tr. 3/24/97 at 59). He stated that he could not

afford to contact an expert witness.
have the money.2

He stated that he did not

(Tr. 3/24/97 at 60). Although, he admitted

that he would have preferred to have had an expert.

(Tr. 3/24/97

at 60, 63). It is clear that the appellant has met the first
prong of the Strickland test and shown deficient performance.
In TemplinF the court considered the second prong of the
test as follows:
This testimony (of a witness not called) is
important for the reason that it reflects
upon the credibility of [the victim], because
[the] testimony, although not completely
consistent with [defendant's] testimony,
contradicts several aspects of [victim's]
testimony. This is important in the instant

2

Counsel's argument that he could not afford an expert witness and therefore he did not
contact any experts,fliesin the face of established minimum standards for indigent defendants.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-l(3)(the state is to provide investigatory and other facilities
necessary for a complete defense). If the appellant truly could not afford an expert it was
counsel's responsibility to call this to the attention of the trial judge and proceed in a manner
whereby the state would pay for the expert.
8

case because [victim's] testimony is the only
direct evident of [defendant's] guilt. In
reviewing this testimony, it is important to
note that because it affects the credibility
of the only witness who gave direct evidence
of defendant's guilt, the testimony affects
the ^entire evidentiary picture.' . . . An
appellate court cannot discern the exact
effect such testimony would have hade on the
jury's judgment concerning the credibility of
[defendant] and [victim]. The testimony,
however, is of sufficient import that we feel
there is a reasonable probability that if
these witnesses had been called at trial, the
outcome of the trial would have been
different. Since both parts of the
Strickland, test have been met, we hold that
[defendant] was denied his constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel.
Templin. at 188-89.
The situation in the present case is similar.
prosecution's case rested on the testimony of

The

Kenneth Struhs.

His testimony was the direct evidence of the appellant's entry
into the residence.

For the appellant to be convicted the jury

had to have believed that he entered the residence and was in the
house when he was shot.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (which

states that to be guilty of burglary a person must "enter or
remain unlawfully in a building").

The appellant's trial

counsel's theory of the case was the fact that the appellant did
not go in the residence and in fact was shot in the back of the
leg and not the front, while he was outside of the

9

dwelling.3

Trial counsel's failure to contact an expert and call

one at trial in support of that theory was ineffective assistance
of counsel.

Furthermore, the appellant was prejudiced by trial

counsel's inaction resulting in a conviction that would not have
been possible had an expert testified to the inconsistencies as
testified to at the hearing on remand.

See Tr. 3/24/97 at 37-41.

Thus, but for trial counsel's deficient performance there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different.

II.

State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995).

TRIAL COUNSEL'S EYESIGHT PROHIBITED
HIM FROM EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING
THE APPELLANT.

Appellant's trial counselfs vision is seriously impaired.
The record is replete with the fact that trial counsel's vision
is impaired.

(Tr. 1/16/96 at 30, 78 and tr. 3/15/96 at 2-3). At

the trial, exhibits in the form of diagrams and photographs were
submitted by the state and it is clear from the record that
appellant's trial counsel could not adequately view these
diagrams and photos.

This fact supports ineffective assistance

of counsel in and of itself as counsel was ineffective in his
ability to represent the appellant. The prejudice from this
factor is self evident an attorney whose eyesight is impaired
3

The appellant has been prejudiced by the fact that had a jury heard testimony to support
the claim that the appellant was never in the house, the most he could have been convicted of
would have been an attempted burglary, a third degree felony.
10

cannot, alone, effectively represent a defendant in a trial.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the appellant respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the appellant's conviction and
remand this case for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ V ^ d a y of September, 1997.

BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Benjamin A. Hamilton, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court
of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's
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Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ^ /
day of September, 1997.

BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON
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